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TITFORTAT


                                         Additions:  July 7, 2000

About Robert Axelrod's 
"The Evolution of Cooperation":

      I think Axelrod essentially    
      confirms that much of what              
      we normally think of as              He makes the point that    
      "altruistic" behavior can            cooperative behavior can    
      arise from purely "selfish"          and does evolve in       
      behavior.                            adversarial situations,    
                                           even without any direct    
      The way I'd put                      communication to assist    
      it: What is                          the process (e.g. WWI    
      usually thought of    Or:            trench warfare, where    
      as "selfishness"      Morality       each side of a stand-off    
      is really             is a way       would gradually learn    
      "shortsightedness".   of arriving    to avoid any real attempt
                            quickly at     at attacking each other.)
                            pragmatic                                   
                            decisions                                   
                            given                                   
       The moral may        imperfect      Much is made of  
       be grounded in       knowledge.     a computerized 
       the real.                           tournament, an 
                                           indefinite series 
           The idealistic,                 of prisoner's 
           derivable from                  dilemma games, 
           the pragmatic.                  where the winning 
                                           strategy was 
                        A is A?            nearly always  
                                           the exceedingly 
                         And               simple "Tit for Tat". 
                         D is D.                                
                                                      Tit for Tat: 
                                                      Always cooperate, 
                                                      unless your 
                                                      opposite number 
                                                      defected on the 
                                                      immediately 
                                                      previous move. 
                                                                         
                                                         Be helpful.     
                                                         Retaliate immediately
                                                            when wronged. 
                                                         Forgive quickly.
                                                                         
                  COMPLAIN_COMPLAIN_COMPLAIN            
                                                         This certainly 
                                                         isn't my strategy:
                                                         I'm inclined to 
A subject: the difficulty of                             the "slow to anger, 
applying the idea of                                     but never forget"
"Tit for Tat".                                           style.  
                                                                 
e.g. what's an appropriate                                       
tat for a given tit?                                     I think it's notable 
                                                         that a close         
Should you apply a                                       competitor of        
sliding scale of                                         Tit-for-Tat          
reprisals, where                                         was Tit-for-Two-Tats, 
you hit back harder     But... attempts                  i.e. let the first   
after a repeated        at more complicated              one slide, and       
offense?                strategies with                  retaliate on the     
                        memory were failures             second offence.       
How do you manage to    in the tournament.               
be both "provocable"                                     A variation of  
and "forgiving" in a                                     "turn the other 
world where things                                       cheek"... given 
are not neatly                                           that we only      
divided into rounds                                      have two cheeks.   
of exchanges of a                                                           
limited kind of                                                (or is it   
interaction?                                                   four?)        
                                                                            
And... isn't Tit for Tat                                                  
a strategy that can                                                          
reduce you to the level                                                  
of your opponent?                                                        
                                                                            
You can lose when trying to                                                    
convince a third party that                                                 
you're not as bad as your                                                   
opponent.  Yelling "He                                                  
started it!"  isn't going to                        The question is,       
distinguish you very well                           is it possible that
when both sides are lying,                          the tournament     
cheating and killing.                               results are not    
                                                    strictly applicable 
                                                    to reality, which is 
                                                    not precisely a simple 
                                                    extended series of 
                                                    Prisoner's Dilemma 
                                                    games.
                                                    
                                                    Maybe Tit-for-two-tats
                                                    would win in a tournament 
                          (March 7, 2003)           with parameters closer 
                                                    to reality? 
      Axlerod shows that some of what we                        
      consider civilized behavior                         What happens if 
      ("cooperation") falls out of the                    you have some 
      mathematics of strategy.                            freedom to choose 
                                                          who you're going 
      The nature of the autonomous agents                 to play with 
      may not matter very much... if they                 next?  
      *are* autonomous, you can expect                    
      that they'll tend to converge on a                  As I remember it 
      certain kind of behavior over time.                 Axelrod's tournament 
                                                          involved only 
                                                          random pairing of 
                                                          players. 
                                                                   
                                                                Preserving 
                                                                reputation 
                                                                could be 
                                                                worth the 
                                                                loss of  
                                                                a round. 

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