security_reporting_scans

This is part of The Pile, a partial archive of some open source mailing lists and newsgroups.



Date: Mon, 02 Oct 2000 10:10:20 -0700
To: svlug@svlug.org
From: Roger Lynker <rlynker@mindspring.com>
Subject: [svlug] Pac Bell system attacks

Hello,

Does anyone know who to email about the constant attempted attacks to my 
system?  I have a Pac Bell account and the attacks are (mostly) coming from 
another Pac Bell account.  There's no danger of this person succeeding as I 
have everything turned off except SSH (and he/she keeps probing port 
161....SNMP), but when someone tries then gets blocked then relogs in to 
try again.....that's just stupidity....and that person should be 
punished....even if all they're doing to me is making my hosts.deny file 
bigger.  I tried abuse@pacbell.net but got no response.....I will probably 
try that address again unless someone knows of another?  Thanks.

===

To: Roger Lynker <rlynker@mindspring.com>
Subject: Re: [svlug] Pac Bell system attacks 
Date: Mon, 02 Oct 2000 10:32:55 -0700
From: J C Lawrence <claw@kanga.nu>

On Mon, 02 Oct 2000 10:10:20 -0700 
Roger Lynker <rlynker@mindspring.com> wrote:

> There's no danger of this person succeeding as I have everything
> turned off except SSH (and he/she keeps probing port
> 161....SNMP)...

I'd wager that they are not attacks, but are instead a mis-addressed
SNMP monitoring service ala Mon, Cricket, etc.  There's not been that 
much history of SNMP cracks and it seems a mite unlikely that you'd
get harped on for that alone.

===

Date: Mon, 02 Oct 2000 10:42:57 -0700
To: svlug@svlug.org
From: Roger Lynker <rlynker@mindspring.com>
Subject: Re: [svlug] Pac Bell system attacks 

Thanks for the help.  I couldn't quite figure out why it was going to port 
161 only...and not 111 or the BO port (forget the number).  Is there a list 
somewhere of ports I should closely?  I mean I have them all turned off, 
but I like to know what ports they're scanning (for those that aren't 
listed in /etc/services).  Thanks again.

===


Date: Mon, 2 Oct 2000 10:45:12 -0700 (PDT)
From: "Brian W." <bri@sonicboom.org>
To: Roger Lynker <rlynker@mindspring.com>
Subject: Re: [svlug] Pac Bell system attacks

usually security@domainname is the first thing to try for security type
things.

===

Date: Mon, 2 Oct 2000 10:58:27 -0700
From: Don Marti <dmarti@zgp.org>
To: Roger Lynker <rlynker@mindspring.com>
Cc: svlug@svlug.org
Subject: Re: [svlug] Pac Bell system attacks

begin  Roger Lynker quotation of Mon, Oct 02, 2000 at 10:10:20AM -0700:

> Does anyone know who to email about the constant attempted attacks to my 
> system? 

"abuse" addresses are almost always a "thank you for the spam complaint"
autoresponder.

You'll need to pick up the phone and work your way through menus and
voicemail crap to get the network operations center. Be sure to have all
your info, logs, etc. on the probing available.

Try the phone number in the whois record before the one on the web site,
if they're different.

===

Date: Mon, 2 Oct 2000 11:13:18 -0700 (PDT)
From: Bill Selmeier <bills@mast.right-net.com>
To: Roger Lynker <rlynker@mindspring.com>
Subject: Re: [svlug] Pac Bell system attacks

The contact point for this domain according to whois is"

trouble@PBI.NET

===

Date: Mon, 2 Oct 2000 11:20:39 -0700
To: svlug@svlug.org
Subject: Re: [svlug] Pac Bell system attacks
From: Rick Moen <rick@linuxmafia.com>

begin Roger Lynker quotation:

> There's no danger of this person succeeding as I have everything
> turned off except SSH (and he/she keeps probing port 161....SNMP), but
> when someone tries then gets blocked then relogs in to try
> again.....that's just stupidity....and that person should be punished.

So, Roger, welcome to monitoring for network probes.  You'll find that
(1) genuine probes happen many times a day, (2) contacts that could be 
innocent or not depending on your perspective happen even more often
(which one might classify as "twisting the doorknob"), and (3) both are
sometimes difficult to distinguish from 100% innocent traffic.

Even if you're successful at distinguishing true, aggressive, intensive
probes (e.g., heavy port-scanning), you're going to be a really busy guy
if you try to go after them all.

===

Date: Mon, 2 Oct 2000 11:22:13 -0700 (PDT)
From: "Brian W." <bri@sonicboom.org>
To: Roger Lynker <rlynker@mindspring.com>
Subject: Re: [svlug] Pac Bell system attacks 

I use http://www.isi.edu/in-notes/iana/assignments/port-numbers for a port
number directory..

===

To: Roger Lynker <rlynker@mindspring.com>
Subject: Re: [svlug] Pac Bell system attacks 
Date: Mon, 02 Oct 2000 11:30:22 -0700
From: J C Lawrence <claw@kanga.nu>

On Mon, 02 Oct 2000 10:42:57 -0700 
Roger Lynker <rlynker@mindspring.com> wrote:

> Is there a list somewhere of ports I should closely?  

Tough call.  I generally get twitchy about the following:

  Anything below 20
  21 (FTP)  
  23 (telnet)
  53 (DNS)
  69 (tftpd)
  79 (finger)
  88 (kerberos)
  98 (linuxconf)
  109 (pop2)
  111 (sunrpc)
  113 (auth)
  137-139 (netbios)
  1080 (socks)
  3306 (mysql)

I certainly watch more than that to be sure, but that's not a bad
starting point.  Portsentry IIRC correctly comes with some decent
defaults in this area.  Certainly the Debian package isn't terrible
in either its defaults or suggestions:

  # Un-comment these if you are really anal:
  #TCP_PORTS="1,7,9,11,15,70,79,80,109,110,111,119,138,139,143,512,513,514,515,540,635,1080,1524,2000,2001,4000,4001,5742,6000,6001,6667,12345,12346,20034,30303,32771,32772,32773,32774,31337,40421,40425,49724,54320"
  #UDP_PORTS="1,7,9,66,67,68,69,111,137,138,161,162,474,513,517,518,635,640,641,666,700,2049,32770,32771,32772,32773,32774,31337,54321"
  #
  # Use these if you just want to be aware:
  #TCP_PORTS="1,11,15,79,111,119,143,540,635,1080,1524,2000,5742,6667,12345,12346,20034,31337,32771,32772,32773,32774,40421,49724,54320"
  #UDP_PORTS="1,7,9,69,161,162,513,635,640,641,700,32770,32771,32772,32773,32774,31337,54321"
  #
  # Use these for just bare-bones
  #TCP_PORTS="1,11,15,110,111,143,540,635,1080,524,2000,12345,12346,20034,32771,32772,32773,32774,49724,54320"
  #UDP_PORTS="1,7,9,69,161,162,513,640,700,32770,32771,32772,32773,32774,31337,54321"

===

Date: Mon, 2 Oct 2000 11:33:34 -0700
To: svlug@svlug.org
Subject: Re: [svlug] Pac Bell system attacks
From: Rick Moen <rick@linuxmafia.com>

begin Roger Lynker quotation:

> Is there a list somewhere of ports I should [monitor] closely? 

Good luck on _that_.  If you want just a fairly comprehensive list of
official TCP/UDP port number assignments, start here:

http://www.iana.org/  
   Link "Protocol Numbers and Assignment Servers" goes to
http://www.iana.org/numbers.htm  
   Link "port numbers" goes to
http://www.isi.edu/in-notes/iana/assignments/port-numbers

There are better-organised listings elsewhere (e.g., the one linked from
http://www.networksorcery.com/enp/), but that's the easiest to
find, and has IANA's imprimatur.

Want to know _which_ ports are security-sensitive?  Welcome to the study
of security.  You'll have fun reading Craig Hunt's _TCP/IP Network
Administration_, Nemeth and Frisch's sysadmin manuals, and a sampling of
the better books on Unix security.

====

Date: Mon, 2 Oct 2000 12:50:34 -0700
To: svlug@svlug.org
Subject: Re: [svlug] Pac Bell system attacks
From: Rick Moen <rick@linuxmafia.com>

begin J C Lawrence quotation:

> Tough call.  I generally get twitchy about the following:

As usual, there a question of policy:  Do you care only about
security-sensitive services you _actually_ run?  Do you care about ones
that others run on your OS, but that you don't?  Do you care about ones
operated only on exotic platforms you don't have?  Do you care about
detecting attempts to exploit known flaws in daemon software you _don't_
run?  What do you call a security-sensitive service, and why?  What are
you trying to detect, and towards what end?  How are you going to
distinguish between innocent and suspicious contacts?

>   Anything below 20

Echo, discard, daytime, qotd, and chargen are pretty tame, as DOS
weapons go.

>   113 (auth)

With knowledge of the many mundane reasons your auth port might be
queried, I assume.

But, unless the guy reads up on what all this is and what its
significance is, all he's going to gain is an object lesson in the
distinction between data and information.

===

To: Rick Moen <rick@linuxmafia.com>
Subject: Re: [svlug] Pac Bell system attacks 
Date: Mon, 02 Oct 2000 13:06:35 -0700
From: J C Lawrence <claw@kanga.nu>

On Mon, 2 Oct 2000 12:50:34 -0700 
Rick Moen <rick@linuxmafia.com> wrote:

> begin J C Lawrence quotation:

>> Anything below 20

> Echo, discard, daytime, qotd, and chargen are pretty tame, as DOS
> weapons go.

Very.  However connects to them are both rare and worthy of
examination in my book.  

>> 113 (auth)

> With knowledge of the many mundane reasons your auth port might be
> queried, I assume.

Yep.

===

Date: 2 Oct 2000 22:22:42 -0000
Subject: Re: [svlug] Pac Bell system attacks
From: John Conover <conover@rahul.net>
To: svlug@lists.svlug.org

Crack attempts are just the contemporary nature of the Internet, and
one has to live with it, unfortunately, (and it has created a big
market for Linux/BSD consultants installing boxes in the enterprise as
specialized gateways/NATs/firewalls-not to mention a lucrative market
for the likes of Cisco, etc.)

However, be advised, the /var/log/syslog entries from ipchains can be
misleading. Look at the -S option to nmap(1) as an example.

I have traced back crack packets, like the ones you mentioned, and
most/many are initiated in Korea, China, and Russia, in that order,
(university students in the US follow at a distant fourth, Japan a
very distant fifth.) And, the vandals target ISP's PPP lines, too,
(there is usually a lot of mis-configured junk hanging on ISP's dial
in lines-so its easy prey. Ditto *DSL.)

There just isn't much one can do, other than be vigilant with
comprehensive firewall rules and NAT/masquerading, and run something
like portsentry(1) from Psionic, (http://www.psionic.com/,) to
automagically configure ipchains to DENY/REJECT nefarious rogue sites
dynamically, (i.e., on the fly, as soon as a rogue packet hits a
port,) and always make sure the gateway has the capability to out run
anything that comes down the pipe-which can be a big issue if the pipe
has high bandwidth, and the gateway gets loaded down with other stuff,
(like running SMTP, WWW, and DNS services on the gateway, too.)

At any rate, its not going to go away, so one has to live with it.

===

the rest of The Pile (a partial mailing list archive)

doom@kzsu.stanford.edu