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EPISTEM_MOMENT
September 8, 2020
EPISTEMS
About In Bertrand Russell's piece,
"Epistemological Premises" (1940):
See Russell's "Basic Writings":
http://emilkirkegaard.dk/en/wp-content/uploads/The-Basic-Writings-of-Bertrand-Russell.pdf
This material is actually quite good:
"Epistemological premisses are different
according as they are momentary,
individual, or social."
Russell steps through a few basic examples of
how we know things.
"... I believe that 16^2 = 256; at the moment, I
believe this on grounds of memory, but probably at
some time I did the sum, and I have convinced myself
that the received rules of multiplication follow from
the premisses of logic. Therefore taking my life as a
whole, 16^2 = 256 is inferred, not from memory, but
from logic. In this case, if my logic is correct,
there is no difference between the individual and the
social premisses."
"But now let us take the existence of the Straits
of Magellan. Again, my momentary epistemological
premiss is memory. But I have had, at various
times, better reasons: maps, books of travel,
etc. My reasons have been the assertions of others,
whom I believe to be well-informed and
honest. Their reasons, traced back, lead to
percepts: Magellan, and others who have been in the
region concerned when it was not foggy, saw what
they took to be land and sea, and by dint of
systematized inferences made maps. Treating the
knowledge of mankind as one whole, it is the
percepts of Magellan and other travellers that
provide the epistemological premisses for belief in
the Straits of Magellan. Writers who are interested
in knowledge as a social phenomenon are apt to SOCIAL_EPISTEMOLOGY
concentrate upon social epistemological premisses.
For certain purposes this is legitimate, for others
not. Social epistemological premisses are relevant
in deciding whether to spend public money on a new
telescope or an investigation of the Trobriand
Islanders. Laboratory experiments aim at
establishing new factual premisses which can be
incorporated in the accepted system of human
knowledge."
"For me now, only my epistemological premisses
momentary epistemological premisses are really
premisses; the rest must be in some sense
inferred. For me as opposed to others, my individual
premisses are premisses, but the percepts of others
are not."
"My momentary knowledge consists largely of memory,
and my individual knowledge consists largely of
testimony. But memory, when it is veridical, is
related to a previous perceptive premiss, and
testimony, when it is veridical, is related to
someone else’s perceptive premiss. Social empiricism
takes these perceptive premisses of other times or
other persons as the empirical premisses for what is
now accepted, and thus evades the problems connected
with memory and testi- mony. This is plainly
illegitimate, since there is reason to believe that
both memory and testimony sometimes deceive."
"If I, now, am to have any reason to believe what I read
yesterday in the Encyclopaedia, I must, now, find reason to
trust my memory, and to believe, in suitable circumstances,
what comes to me in the form of testimony. I must, that is to
say, start from momentary epistemological premisses. To do
anything else is to evade problems which it is part of the
business of epistemology to consider."
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