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RUSSELLING_DEWEY_1939
December 27, 2021
Bertrand Russell,
writing about John
Dewey's "Logic: The THE_INEVITABLE_META
Theory of Inquiry":
"This book is very rich and varied in its contents;
it contains highly interesting criticisms of past
philosophers, very able analyses of the prejudices
inspiring traditional formal logic, and an intimate
awareness of the realities of scientific
investigation. All this makes the book far more
concrete than most books called 'Logic'."
"Beliefs, we are now supposing, may be tested by
their consequences, and may be considered to
possess 'warranted assertibility' when their
consequences are of certain kinds. The
consequences to be considered relevant may be
logical consequences only, or may be widened to
embrace all kinds of effects; and between these
two extremes any numbe of intermediate positions
are possible. In the case of the car that won't
go, you think it may be this, or it may be that,
or it may be the other; if it is *this* and I do
so-and-so, the car will go; I do so-and-so and the
care does not go; therefore it was not *this*.
But when I apply the same experimental procedure
to the hypothesis that it was *that*, the car does
go; therefore the belief that it was *that* has I'd prefer:
'warranted assertibility'. So far, we have only
the ordinary procedure of induction: 'If *p*, then "If p, then q;
*q*; now *q* is true; therefore *p* is true.' now q is true;
E.g. 'If pigs have wings, then some winged animals could it be
are good to eat; now some winged animals are good p is true?"
to eat; therefore pigs have wings.' This form of
inference is called 'scientific method'."
One suspects
Russell jests here. The traditional "scientific
method" might start with
More could be this sort of inductive
said about reasoning as a guess (the
"Russell's pigs": "hypothesis"), but it would
only gradually become
Traditional "logic accepted after confirmation
101" likes absurd by further investigation.
examples like this
to obviate the use Something like the
of intuition. "inquiry" that
Russell seems to
The absurdity feel is overrated
makes Russell's by Dewey.
joke work.
Actual scientists
would avoid such an
absurd hypothesis.
So "hypothesis formation"
is not *just* induction,
intuition is used to
make better guesses.
Dewey, being of pragmatic
bent, is not likely to
object to some intuition
in his inquiry.
It is possible, however, It is also possible
that Dewey was somewhat that he was aware
unaware of some such of them, and they
unstated features of the weren't left
inquiry process. "unstated", but
Russell is Two
downplaying this in hypotheses
a cartoon version. for me to
check with
further
inquiry.
"A hypothesis is called 'true' when it leads the
person entertaining it to acts which have effects
that he desires. This is obviously too wide.
Acts have many consequences, of which some may be
pleasant and others unpleasant. In the case of
the car, it may, when it finally moves, move so
suddenly that it causes you serious bodily injury;
this does not show that you were mistaken as to
what was the matter with it. Or take another
illustraion: In a school, a prize is offered for
the child that shows most general intelligence; on
class-work, four are selected, and the final test
is by a _viva voce_; the _viva_ consists of one
question, 'who is the greatest man now ilving?'
One child says Roosevelt, one says Stalin, one
says Hitler, and one says Mussolini. One of them
gets the prize, and has therefore, by definition,
answered truly. If you which gets the prize, you
know in what country the test was made. It
follows that truth is geographical. But this
consequence, for some reason, pragmatists would be
unwilling to admit."
Well, before being willing to admit it,
they might ask "what's in it for me?".
"The pragmatist's position, if I am not mistaken, is
a product of a limited scepticism supplemented by a
surprising dogmatism. Our beliefs are obviously not
always right, and often call for emendation rather
than total rejection. Many questions of the highest
emotional interest cannot be answered by means of
any of the old conceptions of 'truth', while many of
the questions that can be answered, such as 'is this
red?' are so uninteresting that the pragmatist
ignores them. But in spite of his scepticism, he is
confident that he can know whether the consequences
of entertaining a belief are such as to satisfy
desire. This knowledge is surely far more difficult
to secure than the knowledge that the pragmatist
begins by questioning, and will have to be obtained,
if at all, not by the pragmatist's method, which
would lead to an endless regress, but by the very
method of observation which, in simpler cases, he
has rejected as inadequate."
"Inquiry, in his system, operates upon a raw
material, which it gradually transforms; it is
only the final product that can be known. The raw
material remains an Unknowable. That being the
case, it is not quite clear why it is supposed to But similarly, one
exist. ..." might wonder why
one would suppose
"... in Dr. Dewey's system, "absolute truth"
nothing can be fully known exits.
except the ultimate result of
'inquiry'." This is a shot that
hits many such
"I find this view difficult, philosophies...
not only theoretically, but in
view of the actual history of
scientific knowledge. ... it
can hardly be supposed that the (May 26, 2022)
sun and the planets are much
altered by the observations of If you think about "inquiry" transforming
the astronomers." the source material, clearly what you
would mean is that the body of knowledge
is transformed, the material that inquiry
acts on is observational data combined
with past recorded observations and
conclusions-- inquiry works with your
intellectual framework to transform your
intellectual framework.
The eternal stars can rest
easy, their nature will
remain unchanged by our gaze.
If that implies that I believe
in an external reality, I'm
"Telescopes, it is true, alter okay with that, myself
the sense-data by means of
which we know about the
heavenly bodies, but
sense-data, according to
Dr. Dewey, are not the Myself, I would probably say that
subject-matter of knowledge." "sense data" is a part of knowledge.
Or I might say it's some of the source
material that knowledge is drawn from.
Dewey was also rather Or any number of other mildly
peeved at Lotze who at inconsistent, slightly contradictory
least has a reputation as things that don't actually bother
an idealist of sorts-- if anyone below Russell's pay grade.
the stuff of reality is
really supposed to be our
'inquiry', that would
seem to be getting close
to philosophical idealism
again.
Russell conceeds the main point:
"In older philosophies, knowledge was
conceived too passively, as though it
consisted merely in recieving an
imprint from the object."
But adds:
"I think, however, that, with modern
terminology, something not wholly
unlike this passive conception of This strikes me as rather
knowledge may still be justified." tentative and wishy-washy
for a believer in truth.
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