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RUSSELL_KANT_EUCLID
September 13, 2020
Bertrand Russell, jamming around on the subject of
the connections between geometry and reality:
"It was formerly supposed that Geometry was the study of the
nature of the space in which we live, and accordingly it was
urged, by those who held that what exists can only be known
empirically, that Geometry should really be regarded as
belonging to applied mathematics. But it has gradually
appeared, by the increase of non-Euclidean systems, that
Geometry throw's no more light upon the nature of space than
Arithmetic throws upon the population of the United
States. Geometry is a whole collection of deductive sciences
based on a corresponding collection of sets of axioms. One set
of axioms is Euclid’s; other equally good sets of axioms lead
to other results. Whether Euclid’s axioms are true, is a
question as to which the the pure mathematician is indifferent;
and, what is more, it is a question which it is theoretically
impossible to answer with certainty in the affirmative."
"The Study of Mathematics" (1907)
originally published in _New Quarterly_
collected in "Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays" (1917)
p. 71
I puzzled over what Russell might be trying to
say here because I would've thought that the
truth of Euclidian geometry would be answered
"with certainty", but *in the negative*--
modern physics insists we live in a
non-Euclidian universe of curved space.
Then it dawned on me to think about the
date of publication: 1907.
Einstein's theory of General Relativity
wasn't published until 1915.
In retrospect, Russell looks somewhat
prescient there-- at least it's occurred
to him that Euclid wasn't at all firmly
established.
"Kant, rightly perceiving that Euclid's propositions
could not be deduced from Euclid's axioms without the
help of the figures, invented a theory of knowledge to
account for this fact; and it accounted so successfully
that, when the fact is shown to be a mere defect in
Euclid, and not a result of the nature of geometrical
reasoning, Kant's theory also has to be abandoned. The
whole doctrine of a priori intuitions, by which Kant
explained the possibility of pure mathematics, is wholly
inapplicable to mathematics in its present form."
"Mathematics and Metaphysicians" (1901)
originally published in _International Monthly_
collected in "Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays" (1917)
p. 96
I'm afraid this all strikes me as Russell
assuming the conclusion he wants...
Isn't it the case that what we have here are
two ways of knowing, and both get to the
same place? Why prefer one path or the other?
It doesn't strike me as a terrible thing to
work out the rules of geometry empirically, One of Roger Bacon's
using figure drawing to gain insight. examples in support
of experimentalism
was drawing a triangle.
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